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Abstract
We introduce a computer program which calculates an agent’s optimal behavior according to Case-based
Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995) and use it to test CBDT against a benchmark set of problems
from the psychological literature on human classification learning (Shepard et al., 1961). This allows us to
evaluate the efficacy of CBDT as an account of human decision-making on this set of problems.
We find: (1) The choice behavior of this program (and therefore Case-based Decision Theory) correctly
predicts the empirically observed relative difficulty of problems and speed of learning in human data. (2)
‘Similarity’ (how CBDT decision makers extrapolate from memory) is decreasing in vector distance, consis-
tent with evidence in psychology (Shepard, 1987). (3) The best-fitting parameters suggest humans aspire
to an 80 − 85% success rate, and humans may increase their aspiration level during the experiment. (4)
Average similarity is rejected in favor of additive similarity.
JEL codes: D83, C63, C88
Keywords: Case-based Decision Theory, Human Cognition, Learning, Agent-based Computational
Economics, Psychology, Cognitive Science
1. Introduction
We present a computational implementation of Case-based Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler,
1995) called the Case-based Software Agent or CBSA. CBSA is a computer program that calculates an
agent’s optimal behavior according to Case-based Decision Theory for an arbitrary problem. Like Expected
Utility Theory, Case-based Decision Theory is a mathematical model of choice under uncertainty. Case-based
Decision Theory has the following primitives: A set of problems or circumstances that the agent faces; a set
of actions that the agent can choose in response to these problems; and a set of results which occur when an
action is applied to a problem. Together, a problem, action, and result triplet is called a case, and can be
thought of as one complete learning experience. The agent has a finite set of cases, called a memory, which
it consults when making new decisions.
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The Case-based Software Agent is a software agent, i.e. “an encapsulated piece of software that includes
data together with behavioral methods that act on these data (Tesfatsion, 2006).” CBSA computes choice
data consistent with an instance of CBDT for an arbitrary choice problem or game, provided that the
problem is well-defined and sufficiently bounded (see Section 3). To examine CBSA’s relationship with
human learning, we chose to generate data for a set of problems from the psychological literature on human
classification learning starting with Shepard et al. (1961). In these problems, human decision makers classify
objects described by vectors of characteristics, such as color and shape, and are rewarded when they classify
the objects correctly. The data include variables such as probability of error over time, which allows one to
observe relative difficulty and speed of problem-solving/learning. We generate simulated choice data that is
both consistent with Case-based Decision Theory and directly comparable to human data collected on the
same set of problems.
This is the first instance of simulating nuanced choice data implied by an economic decision theory
that can be brought to existing human choice data from psychology. Behavioral economics is typically
characterized by applying insights from psychology to economics via a mathematical model, sometimes with
modification, which is then tested using economic statistical methodologies on economic data (e.g. Laibson
(1997), Fudenberg and Levine (2006)). This paper does the reverse: it tests a decision theory from economics
using psychological methods and data.
In the framework of Case-based Decision Theory, the effects of actions on new problems are extrapolated
from memory by evaluating the similarity between problems. The extrapolation from problems in CBDT is
similar to generalization from stimuli in psychology. The study of generalization in psychology has lead to a
remarkably specific empirical estimate of the functional form of similarity among humans (Shepard, 1987).
We test this form with CBSA and find empirical support.
We are able to establish four key facts about CBDT and its relationship with human choice behavior in
these classification learning experiments.
First, we find the choice behavior of CBSA fits two canonical experiments’ worth of human choice data
very well. The best-fitting benchmark model fits both the relative difficulty of these categorization problems
and the speed of learning to solve these sorting problems (i.e. probability of error over time). Moreover, the
best-fitting benchmark model fits human data with a mean-squared error near the leading choice models in
psychology. (This is the standard that psychology uses to evaluate models of classification learning.) This
consistency with human behavior should be taken as a vote of confidence in support of CBSA as an account
of human decision-making.2
Second, we find that, consistent with research in psychology cited above (Shepard, 1987), similarity
functions that are decreasing in vector distance induce the best match to human data. On the other hand,
whether the distance is mapped to similarity via an inverse exponential function, versus some other decreasing
function, appears to not be critical.
Third, we find the best-fitting aspiration level, which can be thought of as a target success rate in the
2This is an account of human decision-making in the same sense that a representation theorem provides an account of
decision-making: That is, given the observed human choice behavior, we can find an instance of CBSA which generates the
same or similar choice behavior, in the same way that when an agents’ choices satisfy certain axioms, we can find a utility
function and similarity function that generate that agent’s behavior. We have achieved behavioral predictability, but in neither
case can we claim that we have uncovered the actual inner workings of the agent’s mind.
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classification problem, is 80 − 85%. This falls into the range consistent with a correctly-specified choice
model.3 We also find some evidence that agents start at a lower aspiration level, around 70%, and increase
their aspiration levels during the course of the experiment in a manner consistent with Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1996).
Fourth, we find that additive similarity provides a better match for human data than does average
similarity.
We augment CBDT in two ways in this computational implementation. First, we provide a dynamic,
endogenous similarity function following the ALCOVE model from psychology (Kruschke, 1992). A dynamic
similarity function is necessary to match one of the two human data sets; the other is matched with static
similarity. Second, we introduce two different models of imperfect memory: imperfect storage (stochastic
‘writing to memory’) and imperfect recall (stochastic ‘reading from memory’). Imperfect memory brings
the speed of CBSA problem mastery in line with humans: with perfect memory, CBSA learns much too
fast. Moreover, it appears that imperfect recall is more important than imperfect storage, which suggests
cognitive processing limitations as opposed to storage-capacity limitations.
Below, we review the relevant literature in decision theory and agent-based computational economics
(Section 2); we define CBSA precisely, then show that CBSA correctly and completely implements Case-
based Decision Theory (CBDT), and therefore an instance of CBSA is an instance of CBDT (Section 3); we
then introduce the psychology of human classification learning and relate it to decision theory (Section 4),
including defining the two augmentations of CBDT we pursue (Subsections 3.3 and 4.3). Then we present
and discuss our empirical results (Section 5) and conclude with some implications for future work (Section
6).
2. Related Literature
To define a decision theory in the tradition of Savage and von Neumann and Morgenstern, an agent’s
choice behavior is observed and, if the choice behavior follows certain axioms, then a mathematical represen-
tation of utility, beliefs, et cetera can be constructed (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954).
In an implementation, this is turned on its head: the mathematical representation is taken as given and
choice behavior is produced. The purpose is to generate choice behavior for particular problems in hopes
of finding empirical patterns in choice behavior that were not be a priori obvious from the mathematical
representation alone. These patterns, coupled with human choice data, can be used to empirically test the
hypothesis that the implemented decision theory describes human behavior. We do that here.
Case-based Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995)—hereafter, CBDT—postulates that when an
agent is confronted with a new problem, she asks herself: How similar is today’s case to cases in memory?
What acts were taken in those cases? What were results? She then forecasts payoffs of actions using her
memory, and choses the action with the highest forecasted payoff.
Formally, in CBDT, the following objects are taken as primitives: (1) a finite set of problems P, (2) a
set of results R or outcomes, and (3) a finite set of acts A which interact with problems to form results. A
3Unless the model is misspecified, the aspiration level must lie between 50%, which is achievable by random selection, and
100%, which is perfect classification.
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set of cases C is defined C = P × A × R, and a subset of cases M⊆ C will be called the “memory” of this
agent. The memory is the data set that the agent draws on to make decisions.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) define two functions: “utility” and “similarity.” Utility u : R → R
measures desirability. Similarity s : P×P → [0, 1] represents how similar one decision problem is to another.
Together, they define case-based utility as:
CBU(a) =
∑
(q,a,r)∈M(a)
s(p, q) [u(r)−H]
Where M(a) is defined as the subset of the agents’ memory M in which action a was taken, and H ∈ R is
an aspiration level (see below). This utility represents the agent’s preference in the sense that, for a fixed
memory M, a is strictly preferred to a′ if and only if CBU(a) > CBU(a′).
CBDT requires an aspiration level H, which the agent uses as a default value for forecasting utility of new
alternatives. “Behaviorially, H defines a level of utility beyond which the DM does not appear to experiment
with new alternatives”(Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1996, page 2). In the experiment considered in this paper,
the aspiration level has a natural interpretation: it is the target success rate in the classification problem.
This paper contributes to a small literature empirically testing the explanatory power of case-based
decision theory; like this paper, these papers find support for CBDT. Gayer et al. (2007) investigate whether
case-based reasoning appears to explain human decision-making using housing sales and rental data. They
hypothesize and find that that sales data are better explained by rules-based measures because sales are an
investment for eventual resale and rules are easier to communicate, while rental data are better explained
by case-based measures because rentals are a pure consumption good where communication of measures
are irrelevant. This is consistent with our results. Ossadnik et al. (2012) run a repeated choice experiment
involving unknown proportions of colored and numbered balls in urns. They find that CBDT explains these
data well compared to alternatives such as minimax (Luce and Raiffa, 1957) and reinforcement learning (Roth
and Erev, 1995). Golosnoy and Okhrin (2008) investigate using CBDT to construct investment portfolios
from real returns data and compare the success of these portfolios to investment portfolios constructed from
EUT-based methods, and find some evidence that using CBDT aids portfolio success.
The central investigative tool of this paper is a software agent, which is “an encapsulated piece of software
that includes data together with behavioral methods that act on these data (Tesfatsion, 2006).” CBSA is
thus part of Agent-based Computational Economics. In fact, CBSA is the first example of agent-based
computational economics making a direct contribution to decision theory. Software agents are common in
the field of artificial intelligence, which, like decision theory, also cites von Neumann as a founder. The
fields are largely distinct, with some notable exceptions, such as Gilboa and Schmeidler (2000), who describe
how CBDT is “closely related to (and partly inspired by) the theory of Case-Based Reasoning proposed by
Riesbeck and Schank (1989) and Schank (1986).”
CBSA is written in the agent-based modeling platform NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999).
3. Case-based Software Agent Description and Verification
In this section, we show that our computational implementation of CBDT, called the Case-based Software
Agent or CBSA, correctly implements the representation specified in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) and
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Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996). First we describe the primitives of the implementation. Then we describe
the algorithms, which implement CBDT in this setting (as we argue in Section 3.2). Finally, we extend the
implementation to handle imperfect memory (Section 3.3).
3.1. Primitives of the Implementation
This implementation has three types of primitives: first, the primitives of CBDT; second, the CBDT
representation; third, a decision environment.
The primitives and representation of CBDT define aspects of decision-making internal to the agent. The
primitives of CBDT are: a finite set of actions A, a finite set of problems P, a set of results R, and the set
of cases C = P × A ×R. Moreover, a set M⊆ C is memory of this agent. From the CBDT representation,
the agent is also endowed with a similarity function s : P × P → R+ and a utility function u : R → R.
The similarity value is interpreted as: the higher a similarity value s(p, q), the more relevant is problem q to
problem p in the mind of the decision-maker.
The decision environment defines those aspects of the series of problems the agent faces that are external
to the agent. We capture the decision environment with a function (algorithm) called the problem-result map
or PRM. The PRM is the transition function of the environment. It takes as input the current problem
p ∈ P the agent is facing, the action a ∈ A that the agent has chosen, and some vector θ ∈ Θ of environmental
characteristics. The PRM returns the outcome of these three inputs: namely, it returns a result r ∈ R; the
next problem p′ ∈ P that the agent faces; and a potentially modified vector of environmental characteristics
θ′ ∈ Θ. I.e.:
PRM : P ×A×Θ→ R×P ×Θ
For example, consider the canonical Savage omelette problem (Savage, 1954, pp. 13-15): the agent must
choose to crack an egg in the main or secondary bowl, and the egg may be rotten or good. The acts are
Main or Secondary. A particular egg is a problem, and the similarity function could describe visual clues
about eggs. Now consider a series of Savage omelette problems. The PRM can be thought of as a device
which delivers new eggs to the agent. It provides an egg which is rotten or not (which embeds the result of
each action) and maintains a θ which describes the remaining eggs.
The PRM which corresponds to the classification learning problem from psychology is specified in Section
4.2.2.
3.2. Algorithms of the Implementation
Figure 1 describes the choice algorithm which implements the core of CBDT. The agent faces a problem
p ∈ P and has a memory M⊆ C. For each action a that she has available to her, she consults her memory
and collects those cases, Ma, in which she performed this act. Then she uses this subset of her memory
to construct a cumulative utility of that act, called here Ua. This value is a similarity-weighted payoff: a
sum across the cases in Ma, the result times the similarity between the problem faced at that time and
the current problem. The agent then chooses the action which corresponds to the maximum U. There is an
additional step, left unspecified in the original CBDT: In the case of a tie, the agent randomizes uniformly
over the acts which achieve this maximum.
Figure 2 describes a single choice problem faced by the agent. It imbeds a reference to the choice
algorithm described in Figure 1. While the choice algorithm describes CBDT in the sense that it describes
5
Input: problem p, memory M.
1. For each a ∈ A:
(a) Construct Ma =
{
(q, a, r)|∃q ∈ P, r ∈ R s.t. (q, a, r) ∈M}
(b) Let Ua =
{∑
(q,a,r)∈Ma s(p, q)
[
u(r)−H], if Ma 6= ∅
0, otherwise
2. Construct set BEST =
{
a ∈ A∣∣Ua = maxb∈A {Ub}}
3. If #(BEST ) = 1 then let a? be the sole entry in BEST. Else choose one
element uniformly from the set BEST and assign that to a?.
Output: Selected action a?
Figure 1: The Choice Algorithm
Input: problem p, memory M, characteristics θ.
1. Input p,M into choice algorithm (Figure 1). Receive output a?.
2. Let (r, p′, θ′) = PRM(p, a?, θ).
3. Let M’ =M∪ {(p, a?, r)}
Output: problem p′, memory M′, characteristics θ′.
Figure 2: A Single Choice Problem.
decision making, the algorithm described in Figure 2 embeds the agent in an environment and explicitly
references that environment, in the call to PRM. In step one, the agent selects an act, a?. In step two, the
action is performed, in the sense that the environment of the agent reacts to the agent’s choice: the PRM
takes the current problem p, the action a? selected by the agent, and the characteristics unobserved by the
agent θ, and constructs a result r, a next problem p′, and a next set of characteristics θ′. In step three, the
agent’s memory is augmented by the new case which was just encountered: that is, the case that was just
experienced is added to the set M. Note that the choice problem maps a problem, characteristic, memory
vector to another vector in the same space, so it can be applied iteratively.
1. Initialize M = ∅. Initialize θ. Initialize first problem p.
2. Evaluate single choice problem with input (p,M, θ). Receive output
(p′,M′, θ′).
3. Evaluate: Does (p′, θ′) achieve ending condition? If so, stop. Else, return to
previous step with new vector (p′,M′, θ′)
Figure 3: A Complete Series of Choice Problems.
Figure 3 describes a complete series of problems faced by an agent. Initially, the agent is assumed to
have an empty memory, and some initial problem p.4 Furthermore, it is assumed that there is some initial
starting condition θ. Essentially, thereafter, the single choice problem is repeated iteratively. In step three
4It is simple to modify the algorithm such that the agent starts with some non-empty memory.
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p′ and θ′ are jointly evaluated against some ending condition, and if that ending condition is achieved, the
algorithm halts.
3.3. Extending the Implementation to Imperfect memory
In the experimental results (Section 5), we demonstrate that the computational implementation of CBDT
described until now masters the problems in these experiments much quicker than humans. To bring our
implementation closer in line with human data without resorting to irrational behavior such as a trembling
hand, we implement imperfect memory.5 There are two ways we consider incorporating imperfect memory
into this model.
Method one: imperfect storage. In this method, we add pstore, which is a probability that any given event
is stored in memory; after a case is experienced by an agent, there is simply a (1− pstore) probability that
the case is immediately forgotten. Formally, this causes a modification to the algorithm depicted in Figure
2, step 3. The modification is depicted in Figure 4.
3’) With probability pstore,
Let M’ =M∪ {(p, a?, r)}
Else let M’ =M
Figure 4: Modification to Figure 2 due to Stochastic Storage
Method two: imperfect recall. Instead of a probability that any given case is stored, the probability that
a given event is accessed or recalled is less than one. We call this probability precall. Formally, when finding
the subset of memory that is relevant to a new problem p, in step 1a of the algorithm depicted in Figure 1,
we draw a binary random variable for each case in memory, and include that case when the binary variable
is 1. The modification due to stochastic recall is depicted in Figure 5.
1a’) For each (q, a, r) ∈M, draw r.v. b(q,a,r) =
{
1, with probability precall
0 otherwise.
Construct Ma =
{
(q, a, r)|b(q,a,r) = 1 AND ∃q ∈ P, r ∈ R s.t. (q, a, r) ∈M
}
Figure 5: Modification to Figure 1 due to Stochastic Recall
Imperfect storage would imply that the relevant limitation is memory space. Imperfect recall would imply
that the relevant limitation is cognitive capacity. There is some evidence from psychology that imperfect
recall should be the preferred choice: the brain exhibits activity during each trial, which suggests every trial
is somehow encoded. We evaluate these two theories of memory in explaining human data in Section 5, and
find some support for the view that imperfect recall is more important.
4. Psychology of Human Classification Learning
The classification problem is used regularly in psychology and cognitive science to study both natural
and artificial agents (Pothos and Wills, 2011). The classification learning problem presents a standard set
5Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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of objects to the agent, who must classify the objects in categories. The correct classifications vary in
complexity and are therefore harder or easier to learn. Psychologists have collected data on how humans
solve these problems. These data include variables such as probability of errors over time. Psychologists have
also developed a number of Models of Classification Learning (MCLs), which, like CBSA, are mathematical
models that are implemented as software programs to generate simulated choice data. Psychologists compare
the fit of MCLs to human data to evaluate the MCLs’ explanatory power. We evaluate CBSA in the same
way to establish our central results.
Game theorists might describe the classification problem as: a choice problem of sorting a series of vectors
into bins, where Nature provides a true mapping of vectors to bins, and the agent’s utility is determined by
her accuracy in following Nature’s mapping. Savage’s omelette problem (Savage, 1954, pp. 13-15) can be
considered a classification problem.
4.1. The SHJ Classification Experiment
Shepard et al. (1961) performed a canonical laboratory experiment which established some empirical
facts about human classification learning. In this study, Shepard et al. (1961) (hereafter SHJ) introduced
a set of objects to be classified: eight elementary objects with three binary dimensions of shape (square or
triangle), color (dark or light), size (large or small). These eight objects can be thought of as three-digit
binary strings. Figure 6 is an illustration of these objects as they are typically represented in the psychology
literature: each binary string is placed on a vertex of the unit cube. SHJ also introduced a now standard
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irrelevant. But to solve Types III, IV, and V, one needs to
spread attention across all three dimensions. 
This interpretation about the influence of selective
attention was corroborated in theoretical analyses of
Shepard et al.’s (1961) tasks conducted by Nosofsky
(1984) and Kruschke (1992). These investigators dem-
onstrated that, without allowing for selective attention
processes, modern exemplar models of category learn-
ing, which formalize in quantitative fashion the princi-
ples of stimulus generalization assumed by Shepard
et al., predict that Type II should be learned more slowly
than Types III, IV, and V. However, with principles of se-
lective attention incorporated, these same models pre-
dict perfectly the ordering of difficulty of the six prob-
lem types.
The stimuli used in Shepard etal.’s (1961) original tasks
and in Nosofsky et al.’s (1994) replication varied along
highly “separable” dimensions. Separable dimensions
remain psychologically distinct when in combination; an
example is forms varying in shape and color. A vast
amount of converging evidence suggests that people are
highly efficient at selectively attending to separable di-
mensions. By contrast, “integral” dimensions combine
into relatively unanalyzable unitary wholes; an example
is colors varying in hue, brightness, and saturation. Al-
though people can selectively attend to integral dimen-
sions to some degree, the process is far less efficient than
what occurs for separable-dimension stimuli. 
Shepard and Chang (1963) reasoned that, if people
learned to classify integral-dimension stimuli, models
based solely on principles of stimulus generalization
might indeed capture the results, because the selective-
attention process that operates for separable-dimension
stimuli would be largely precluded. Shepard and Chang
confirmed this prediction by demonstrating that models
of stimulus generalization without the incorporation of
selective attention provided reasonably good fits to data
from six new category-learning problems in which par-
ticipants classified integral-dimension color stimuli.
A shortcoming of the seminal investigations of Shep-
ard et al. (1961) and Shepard and Chang (1963), how-
ever, is that in addition to varying whether the dimensions
were separable or integral, different category structures
were tested in the two studies. Indeed, the stimuli used by
Shepard et al. varied along three binary-valued dimensions,
whereas in Shepard and Chang’s studies the stimuli var-
ied along two continuous dimensions. Furthermore, the
critical qualitative contrasts in problem difficulty that
were present in Shepard et al.’s (1961) studies (Type II
vs. Types III–V) did not arise for the structures tested by
Shepard and Chang.
Thus, after all these years, there is still a missing part of
the picture. It is critically important to replicate the Shep-
ard et al. (1961) tasks, except using integral-dimension
stimuli instead of separable-dimension ones. The purpose
of the present research was to conduct such an experi-
ment. The prediction stemming from current exemplar
models is that when integral-dimension stimuli are used,
Problem Type II should be learned more slowly than
Problem Types III, IV, and V. 
Figure 1. (Top) The six types of categorization problems tested by
Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961). The eight stimuli are denoted by
the corners of the cubes. Assignments to categories are denoted by the
ovals or rectangles that enclose the stimulus numbers. (Bottom) Exam-
ple in which the stimuli vary along the dimensions of shape, color, and
size.
Figure 6: The eight elementary objects introduced by SHJ.
(Image from Nosofsky et al. (1994).)
set of mappings or classifications T = {I, II, . . . , V I}. SHJ named the six mappings “Problems of Type I
through V I.” It is the relative and absolute performance of sorting under each of these six mappings that we
measure here. Figure 7 shows the six mappings graphically and as a table, where each of the eight objects
is represented as three-digit binary string. Category one is represented by ovals (the letter O) and category
two is represented by rectangles (the letter R).
In the Type I mapping, only the first dimension, e.g. shape, is require to sort the objects correctly: the
left face of the first cube is marked with ovals and the right face is marked with rectangles. By contrast, in
the relatively complic ted Type V I mapping, ll three dimensio s are required to sort the objects correctly.
The intuition that Type VI is more complicated than Type I is reflected in human performance. In
repeat d trials, humans l arn Type I pr blems much faster than Type VI.6 In these trials, images of these
eight objects were shown to people in a laboratory setting in a random order, and, after each category guess,
6There are several empirical facts that have been established about orderings of the Problem Types I through V I. See
Section 4.3 for details.
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ing, which formalize in quantitative fashion the princi-
ples of stimulus generalization assumed by Shepard
et al., predict that Type II should be learned more slowly
than Types III, IV, and V. However, with principles of se-
lective attention incorporated, these same models pre-
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stimuli would be largely precluded. Shepard and Chang
confirmed this prediction by demonstrating that models
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ever, is that in addition to varying whether the dimensions
were separable or integral, different category structures
were tested in the two studies. Indeed, the stimuli used by
Shepard et al. varied along three binary-valued dimensions,
whereas in Shepard and Chang’s studies the stimuli var-
ied along two continuous dimensions. Furthermore, the
critical qualitative contrasts in problem difficulty that
were present in Shepard et al.’s (1961) studies (Type II
vs. Types III–V) did not arise for the structures tested by
Shepard and Chang.
Thus, after all these years, there is still a missing part of
the picture. It is critically important to replicate the Shep-
ard et al. (1961) tasks, except using integral-dimension
stimuli instead of separable-dimension ones. The purpose
of the present research was to conduct such an experi-
ment. The prediction stemming from current exemplar
models is that when integral-dimension stimuli are used,
Problem Type II should be learned more slowly than
Problem Types III, IV, and V. 
Figure 1. (Top) The six types of categorization problems tested by
Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961). The eight stimuli are denoted by
the corners of the cubes. Assignments to categories are denoted by the
ovals or rectangles that enclose the stimulus numbers. (Bottom) Exam-
ple in which the stimuli vary along the dimensions of shape, color, and
size.
Digits Category, by Mapping Type
1 2 3 I II III IV V V I
0 0 0 O O O O O O
0 0 1 O O O O O R
0 1 0 O R O O O R
0 1 1 O R R R R O
1 0 0 R R R O R R
1 0 1 R R O R R O
1 1 0 R O R R R O
1 1 1 R O R R O R
Figure 7: Classifications of Type I through IV.
(Image from Nosofsky et al. (1994).)
the subjects were told whether or not they were correct and given the correct label. MCLs are put through
the same process and given the same feedback. Whether MCLs achieve the same ordering over problems is
an im ortant metric of success in xpla ning human data in the psychology literature, and it is a metric we
use here (see S c ion 5).
4.2. Classification Learning and Case-based Decision Theory
The purpose of this section is to interpret the classification learning problem as understood and tested
by psychologists into the Case-based Decision Theory/CBSA framework, in order to ‘run’ CBDT on the
classification problem in a way to generate simulated data comparable to human data and those simulated
data gen rated by other MCLs. After relating some fundam ntal concepts in the psychology of classification
learning to decision theory, we formally define the the problem-result map (PRM) consistent with the SHJ
series of classification learning experiments a d choose a functional form of similarity based on empirical
work in psychology. (We test this functional form of similarity against alternatives.)
4.2.1. Related concepts in Psychology and Decision Theory
The concept of a problem in CBDT corresponds to the concept of a stimulus in psychology. In describing
the classification learning experiment, a psychologist would refer to an object shown to a decision-maker
as a stimulus. Accordingly, the concept of the problem set P corresponds to the psychological concept of
a psychological space. Psychologists impose m re structure on a psychological space than does CBDT on
a problem set: A psychological space is assumed to be an n-dimensional space, in which each dimension
repr sents some characteristic of the stimul . By contr s , the probl m s ace in CBDT need not have any
particular structure. In SHJ, since the objects have three dimensions, the psychological space is a subset of
R3. Sinc the dimensions are binary, the unit cube is the psychological space of the classification problem.
This is why psychologists chose to represent the eight three-digit binary strings to the vertices of a cube (as
seen in Figure 6). It also implies that a natural sense of similarity be based on geometric distance.
Psychologists posit that humans make guesses about the characteristics of new stimuli from old stimuli,
a process which they call ‘generalization.’ To generalize from a data set in memory to a new problem is
to make predictions about the result of actions undertaken with this new problem. Psychologists study-
ing generalization seek empirical regularities of generalization and even a “universal law of generalization”
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(Shepard, 1987). Case-based Decision Theory describes one way humans might generalize.
4.2.2. The Problem-Result Map (PRM) implied by the Classification Learning Experiments
The Problem-Result Map, or PRM (see Section 3), takes as input {an action a ∈ A, a problem p ∈ P,
and a set of environmental characteristics θ ∈ Θ,} and delivers {a result in r ∈ R, a ‘next problem’ p′ the
agent is to face, and a potentially modified vector of environmental characteristics θ′ ∈ Θ}. In this section,
we define the primitives of CBDT needed to describe the classification problem introduced by SHJ and then
define the PRM.
We define the primitives as follows: Let P be the complete set of three-digit binary strings (therefore
#(P) = 23 = 8). Let A = {a1 = O, a2 = R} be the set of categories. There is a correct mapping, given by
Nature, from strings p ∈ P to categories a ∈ A called F : P → A. Each mapping F is called a classification,
and some F s may be harder to learn than others. We use FI through FV I to evaluate CBSA; these mappings
correspond to the SHJ “Problems of Type I through VI” described above. There is also an aspiration level
H which can be thought of as the target success rate.
Briefly, the choice problem proceeds as follows: Nature selects a string p ∈ P and presents p to the agent.
The agent observes p, and announces a category guess a? ∈ A. Her payoff is determined by whether her
guess is correct, and then Nature presents the agent with a new problem p′.
The environmental characteristic θ ∈ Θ describes those aspects of the environment that are changing
over time. In the classification problem, the only aspect of the environment that is changing over time is the
randomization device: i.e. how Nature determines the next binary string p ∈ P that will be encountered.
We assume that Nature selects p ∈ P according to some distribution; we let Θ be the set of all distributions
over P, so at any given point in time, the next problem will be selected according to the current distribution
θ ∈ Θ.
The PRM in Figure 8 describes how the environment responds to the agent choice.
In Step 1, the result r is determined in the following way: if a? = F (p), then the agent’s category guess
matches the true category for that string, and his answer is ‘correct,’ and r = 1. If a? 6= F (p), then the
guess is ‘incorrect’ and the agent receives a payoff of 0. Given an aspiration level H, then, the payoff that
an agent receives is (1−H) in the case of a correct answer and −H in the case of an incorrect answer, so if
the agent aspires to, for example, a 75% success rate, then the agent receives payoffs .25,−.75.
In Step 2, the next problem p′ is selected.
In Step 3, the next distribution is specified. We are not free to choose θ′; instead, the series of θs must
correspond to how the problems/strings were selected in the actual SHJ experiments. The new environmental
characteristic θ′ ∈ Θ is given by: if all the elements of P have been selected, then θ′ is set to a uniform
distribution over P.7 Otherwise, set to zero the probability of the problem just selected, p′, and reweight the
remaining probabilities according to Bayes’ Rule. This follows the procedure of SHJ, in which the objects
were selected uniformly but without replacement.8
7Any distribution over P could be substituted here, if desired. The uniform distribution is chosen to be consistent with the
human experiments.
8This description is slightly simplified. For the interested reader, we describe the exact randomization process: The first
sixteen trials consist of: the first eight trials consist of all elements of P in a random order, and the second eight trials are again,
all elements of P in a random order. In the second set of sixteen trials, each element of set of P is presented twice in a random
order. All subsequent sets of sixteen trials follow the same randomization procedure as the second set, until the experiment
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Input: act a, problem p, characteristics θ.
1. Set result r.
Let r =
{
1, if a = F (p)
0, if a 6= F (p)
2. Set next problem p′, by drawing p′ from P according to the distribution θ.
3. Set next characteristic θ′.
If θ is a degenerate distribution, then
Let θ′(q) =
1
#(P) ∀q ∈ P
Else
Let θ′(q) =
θ(q) · 1q 6=p∑
q′∈P
[
θ(q′) · 1q′ 6=p
] ∀q ∈ P
Where 1x is the indicator function.
Output: result r, problem p′, characteristics θ′.
Figure 8: The Classification Learning PRM
4.2.3. The Functional Form of Similarity suggested by Psychology
Psychology has done a good deal of research about the functional form of similarity common to humans.
Shepard (1987), in the journal Science, finds that “[e]mpirical results and theoretical derivations point toward
two pervasive regularities of generalization.” He finds that similarity “approximates an exponential decay
function of distance in psychological space.”
In the classification problem, the dimensionality and psychological space of the stimuli are carefully
controlled. In this case, Shepard’s result has remarkably specific implications about the functional form of
similarity: similarity ought to be measured by the inverse exponential of vector distance. Applying this
result, our primary similarity function, which we call simply s, is:
s(p, q) =
1
ed(p,q)
where p, q ∈ {0, 1}3
and d(p, q) =
√√√√ 3∑
i=1
[
αi (pi − qi)2
]
and pi refers to the i
th element of p
and αi ≥ 0, ∀i
concludes.
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The Euclidean distance is weighted with parameters αi, called ‘attentional weights.’ These weights reflect
the relative importance of some dimensions relative to others.9 The initial value of these weights reflect the
agents’ priors about the problem at its onset. In the SHJ problem, it would be natural to assume that all
dimensions have equal prior weight: that is, a priori the agent should think there is no particular reason
that shape is more important than color. In psychology, it is thought that these attentional weights might
change over the course of a run for a particular agent, as the agent learns that some dimensions are more
important for categorization than others. For example, in problem Type I, the only relevant dimension is
the first. Presumably the agent could learn to increase the weight on the first dimension and lower the
weights on the other two dimensions in that case. We consult the psychology literature for guidance on how
to update these weights.
A well-known and successful model of human classification learning (Kruschke, 1992, ALCOVE)10 uses
the same similarity function above11 and also provides a formula for updating attention weights.12 The
formula adjusts the attentional weight “proportionally to the (negative of the) error gradient (p. 24, ibid).”
We construct an update rule by translating the pieces of the ALCOVE update rule into CBSA. This is that
rule:
Suppose a new case c′ = (p′, a′, r′) just occurred and suppose M is the memory of this agent. Then ∆αi
is the change in attentional weight αi due to this new case.
Define xi = −λ
∑
(p,a,r)∈M
[
s(p, p′) · ∣∣pi − p′i∣∣ · (u(r′)− κ) ]
Then let ∆αi = xi −
∑
i xi
# Dimensions
where λ and κ are constants defined below.
Let us describe the intuition of each part of this equation:
λ is a parameter which describes the speed of learning these weights. When λ = 0, there is no updating.
Then we sum over each case in memory, three terms:
The first term represents how similar the problem in memory is to the current choice. If this number is
small, then, all else equal, the change in αi due to this particular case (p, a, c) will be small.
The second term
∣∣pi − p′i∣∣ captures how important dimension i is to the formulation of this choice. It
serves as a flag to indicate whether this dimension doesn’t match the current problem: only dimensions that
do not match are updated.
The third term, (u(r′) + κ) represents whether the choice made was a good choice. κ is chosen so that
u(r′) − κ > 0 when it should be considered a ‘good choice.’ For example, κ could be the agent’s expected
value of u or κ could be equal to the agent’s aspiration level H. Here, we find the natural level of κ is .5, so
that correct choices are valued at .5 and incorrect choices are valued at −.5.
9Billot et al. (2008) provide an axiomatic foundation to this functional form, including weighted Euclidean distance among
problems described as vectors.
10We describe ALCOVE in more detail, and compare its results to CBSA, in Section 5.3.
11Equation 1, p. 23 (ibid.)
12Equation 6, p. 24 (ibid.)
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The intuitive appeal of this formulation can be seen though an example. Suppose the agent just made
a good choice, so (u(r′)− κ) > 0. Suppose moreover that a particular problem p in memory is very similar
to the current problem p′, so s(p, p′) is large. Now suppose that dimension i doesn’t match between p and
p′. One can conclude that dimension i is not as important to the decision as other dimensions. Since a
‘good choice’ was made, the agent concludes that dimension i’s “unimportance” was correct, so the weight
is reduced (note the negative sign.)
Now suppose the agent just made a bad choice, i.e. (u(r′)− κ) < 0. Again, suppose moreover that a
particular problem p in memory is very similar to the current problem p′, so s(p, p′) is large and suppose
that dimension i doesn’t match between p and p′. One can conclude that dimension i is not as important
to the decision. Since the decision was incorrect (because it was a bad choice) the agent concludes that i
“unimportance” was incorrect, so the weight is increased (note the negative sign.)
The final term,
∑
i xi
# Dimensions , assures us that per-period changes sum to zero. This corrects for overall
drift in the weights.
This is the similarity function we use to generate the primary results below. We test this form of similarity
against others. These results are described in Section 5.2.
4.3. The stylized facts of SHJ and related experiments
Here we describe the core phenomenology or stylized facts of human classification learning that have
been empirically established with the SHJ problem set. The original findings of Shepard et al. (1961) have
been replicated using contemporary research methodology as a benchmark for comparison of formal models
(Nosofsky et al., 1994).
I < II < III, IV, V < V I
The key findings are the ease of Type I learning, the difficulty of Type VI learning, approximately equal
difficulty of Types III, IV, V, and a Type II advantage relative to Types III, IV, V. These results have been
replicated repeatedly except for the Type II advantage which appears to depend on particular experimental
conditions (Kurtz et al., 2012). Leading theoretical accounts suggest that this pattern of performance is
attributable to some type of psychological mechanism that allows human learners to focus their attention
on, verbalize, or abstract rules or regularities about particular dimensions (characteristics) of the stimuli.
Nosofsky and Palmeri (1996) studied human learning of the same six category structures using a differ-
ent set of stimuli than the eight objects described above. The SHJ stimuli are based on easily separable
dimensions, that is, a human viewer can easily identify and characterize each item in terms of its dimension
values, as opposed to integral dimensions, which are difficult for a human viewer to distinguish. Shepard and
Chang (1963) predicted that basic principles of stimulus generalization could account for human classifica-
tion learning performance with integral-dimension stimuli, but that a focusing mechanism would be needed
to explain classification learning with separable-dimension stimuli. Nosofsky and Palmeri (1996) tested this
prediction on the SHJ problem set using integral dimensions of hue, saturation, and brightness, which are
not readily picked out for separate analysis by the learner. They found a different ordering of difficulty, one
consistent with pure stimulus generalization theory, confirming Shepard and Chang’s hypothesis. The criti-
cal differences in the ordering are that Type II is the second-most difficult to learn and reliable differences
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are found between Types III, IV, and V. In addition, the learning is slower in general.
I < IV < III < V < II < V I
In its pure form, CBSA does not have a focusing mechanism, because the similarity is assumed to be fixed.
Therefore, the appropriate human data with which to test ‘pure’ CBSA is the integral-stimuli benchmark
Nosofsky and Palmeri (1996), called here NP96. On the other hand, the appropriate human data with which
to test CBSA augmented with updating attention weights (see Section 4.2.3) is the human data in Nosofsky
et al. (1994), called here N94. We show below in Section 5.1 that CBSA matches human data in this way:
with attention weight updating, it best matches N94, and without, NP96.
5. Experimental Results
This section has two parts. In the first part, we consider a benchmark model, and in the second part we
consider model variants. The purpose of the benchmark model is to present a version of CBSA which best
fits the human data. The purpose of the variants is to evaluate alternative specifications.
When discussing fit to human data, there are two relevant human data sets that these models are
compared to, N94 and NP96, which are described in detail in Section 4.1. The data are: probability of error
by block for each of the first twenty-five blocks, for each problem of problem Type I through V I, averaged
across all human subjects. This provides a total of 150 data points (25 blocks × 6 Problem Types) for each
experiment. They can each be thought of as a panel data set, where the panel is performance by Problem
Type over time. The primary difference between N94 and NP96 is the objects that are to be classified. In
N94, the eight objects have the dimensions shape, color, and size, which are easy to distinguish; In NP96 the
eight objects have the dimensions hue, brightness, and saturation, which are hard. Given this difference, in
N94, the expected behavior is that humans learn which dimensions are important. In NP96, the expected
behavior is that humans do not learn which dimensions are important. As a consequence, the prediction
made here is that the best-fit value of λ is greater than zero (some level of attention weight updating) in
N94 and the best-fit value of λ is zero (no attention weight updating) in NP96.13
There are three considerations in choosing a benchmark model: qualitative fit, quantitative fit, and model
complexity.
Qualitative fit to human data is equivalent to matching “stylized facts” of human data. For example,
in N94, Problem Type V I is the most difficult problem (highest probability of error) in all 25 blocks, and
simulation data that have this property are considered to have a better qualitative fit than those that do
not. The more of these regularities are matched, the greater the qualitative fit.
Quantitative fit is a numeric evaluation of fit to human data: for any given set of simulated data, we
construct mean squared error (MSE) between the simulation average probability of error by block and
human averages of the same variable. The lower the MSE, the better the quantitative fit. Even though
perfect quantitative fit implies perfect qualitative fit, in practice quantitative fit often comes at the cost of
qualitative fit.
13These hypotheses follow those for the ALCOVE model after which this updating is modeled. See Sections 4.2.3 and 5.3.
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Model complexity is also known as overfitting in econometrics. This third consideration rests on the
observation that if a model is allowed to be arbitrarily complicated, then perfect qualitative and quantitive
fit can be achieved, but such a model may be undesirable because it doesn’t reveal insight into human
learning and is not generalizable to other kinds of learning. The ‘model complexity’ consideration leads us
to select a simpler model over a more complicated one.
Best-fitting models were chosen by exploring the parameter space through an iterated grid-search. That
is: the parameter space was swept at a certain resolution, and the part of the parameter space that contained
the best fitting models by the considerations listed above (particularly quantitative and qualitative fit) was
then explored at a higher resolution. This was repeated several times until the MSE seemed to no longer
improve except at a cost of qualitative fit. At each stage, each parameter combination was populated with
600 simulation runs.
5.1. The best-fitting benchmark model
The benchmark model has: (1) the inverse exponential of distance similarity function with potentially
endogenous similarity “attention weights” as described in Section 4.2.3 and a parameter λ fit to human data,
(2) imperfect recall of memory as described in Section 3.3 with a parameter precall fit to human data, and
(3) an aspiration success rate parameter H which is fit to human data. Because it contributes little to the
effectiveness of the match to human data, pstore is considered a variant (see Section 5.2 below.)
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Figure 9: Human data N94.
Source: Nosofsky et al. (1994).
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Figure 10: Simulated data: CBSA.
λ = 5, H = .8, precall = .7,MSE = .19
Best-fit benchmark model for N94.
Matching human data of SHJ’61 / Nosofsky et al ’94. The best-fitting benchmark model for N94 has a
MSE of .185, with aspiration level H = .8 and probability of recall precall = .7. Qualitatively, the pictures
in Figures 9 and 10 can be seen to display many of the same characteristics: the same general shape, the
same approximate ordering of I < II ≤ III, IV, V < V I. The CBSA simulated data exhibits some Type II
separation, although in later blocks than exhibited by humans. On the other hand, the difficulty of Type
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V I problems appears to converge to others in the CBSA simulated data, which is not exhibited by humans.
(It is worth noting that other MCLs in the psychology literature also display this convergence.)
λ is found to be 5, which is, as hypothesized, strictly larger than zero; so the best-fitting model exhibits
attention weight updating when the human subjects were able to separately perceive the dimensions of the
objects.
If perfect memory is assumed then CBSA never makes more than ten mistakes, and never after the first
sixteen trials. CBSA with perfect memory is orders of magnitude faster than humans on the same problem.
Therefore, perfect memory can be rejected.
The best-fitting aspiration level is H = .8, which corresponds to agents aspiring to an 80% success rate,
so the best-fitting aspiration level is within the reasonable range (i.e. between .5 and 1). A best-fitting
aspiration level outside of that range would be a strike against the model.
A slightly better MSE of .16 can be achieved with with aspiration level H = .86 and probability of
recall precall = .75, but in those simulated data Type II separation is not observed. Note that Kurtz et al.
(2012) find that whether humans exhibit Type II separation depends on the specification of the experimental
description to the human subjects. So this alternative may in fact be a better fitting model to human data.
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Figure 11: Human data NP96.
Source: Nosofsky and Palmeri (1996).
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Figure 12: Simulated data: CBSA.
λ = 0, H = .85, precall = .6,MSE = .17
Best-fit benchmark model for NP96.
Matching human data of Nosofsky and Palmeri 96. The best-fitting benchmark model for NP96 has an
MSE of .17, with an aspiration level H = .85 and a probability of recall precall = .8. The pictures in Figures
11 and 12 can also be seen to display many of the same characteristics: the same general shape, the same
approximate ordering of I < IV < III < V < II < V I. λ is fitted to a value of zero, which conforms to the
hypothesis; so the best-fitting model exhibits no attention weight updating when the human subjects were
able to not separately perceive the dimensions of the objects.
As in the study of N94, if perfect memory is assumed then CBSA never makes more than ten mistakes,
and never after the first sixteen trials. Again, this conflicts with human data so perfect memory can be
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rejected.
5.2. Model Variants
In this section we investigate alternatives to the benchmark models in the previous section. CBDT as
described in the economics literature allows for many possibilities that are not represented in the benchmark
models above, so we would like to show that these alternatives do not provide better fits than the benchmark
models.
Imperfect memory through imperfect storage. In the benchmark model, imperfect memory was imple-
mented through imperfect recall, not imperfect storage. We found that little was gained from implementing
imperfect storage, so the model complexity consideration lead us to drop this fitted parameter from the
model. In particular, we found the best fitting imperfect storage value was .95 in both N94 and NP96 with
approximately equal MSE and a small increase in precall. On the other hand, simulations in which precall was
constrained to equal 1 resulted in a much higher MSE (doubling) and results in the behavior that problem
Type VI becomes easier than other problems around trial 4, which is behavior not exhibited by humans.
Functional form of similarity. Shepard (1987) recommends the inverse exponential of Euclidean distance
for matching human notions of similarity (i.e. e−d(p,q), where d(p, q) is Euclidean vector distance). The
exponential functional form of distance appears not to be critical. We test against two alternatives to the
inverse exponential function s recommended by Shepard. The two alternatives considered here are of a
simple inverse and inverse log, which we call s′ and s′′ respectively:
s′(p, q) =
1
d(p, q) + 1
s′′(p, q) =
1
ln (d(p, q) + 1) + 1
(Ones are added to avoid division-by-zero and log-of-zero problems.) In these results, there is no difference
in the relative difficulty ranking for N94 and NP96 and a similar quantitative fit is achieved.
In contrast, it is critical that similarity decreases in geometric distance. The underlying distance met-
ric dictates which objects the agent extrapolates (or generalizes) to first. To understand this, consider
the similarity function s=, in which all objects are similar to themselves but all other objects are equally
dissimilar.
s=(p, q) =
1 if p = q0 otherwise su(p, q) =
1 if p = q.5 otherwise
Under s=, an agent does not extrapolate from any object to any other object. A minor variant, su, can be
thought of as a uniform prior, in which all distinct objects are thought to be equally similar. Under both of
these distance metrics, the agent finds problems of Type I through VI to be equally difficult. This clearly
conflicts with human data.14 In addition, one can also find similarity functions which are organized around
principles other than geometric distance, which can reverse orderings consistent in all human data (N94
14Curiously, the similarity function s= delivers a learning rate that matches human learning with the same memory parameter
values (precall = .7) at par with learning the easiest problem (Type I), and also beats the function su. This suggests that non-
trivial similarity functions do not help, and may impair, performance. It prompts the question of why humans might have such
similarity functions, if they are at best unhelpful. That question is beyond the scope of this paper.
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and NP96). For example, one similarity function induces agents to find problem Type V I, consistently the
hardest in human data, easier than problem Type I, which is consistently the easiest in human data.15
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Figure 13: Random Sample of Runs, CBSA
Additive Similarity, Category VI
Prob Error, Random Sample of Runs, Average Similarity
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Figure 14: Random Sample of Runs, CBSA
Average Similarity Variant, Category VI
Average similarity is an alternative similarity function proposed in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995). It has
the following functional form:
savg(p, q) =
s(p, q)∑
(q′,a,r)∈M s(p, q′)
Normal similarity, also called additive similarity, accumulates weight with similarity and data accumulation.
Average similarity removes the data accumulation aspect. The qualitative and quantitative fit of average
similarity simulations are approximately the same as the benchmark model. This suggests that additive
versus average similarity may be unimportant. However, a closer inspection of the simulated data reveals
this is not true. Figure 13 depicts thirty randomly-selected runs of the best-fitting benchmark model,
considering only the behavior on the Problem Type VI.16 The mean value for all runs and the human data
are also depicted. Note that the simulated data forms something of a cloud around the mean. Figure
14 depicts thirty randomly-selected runs of the model with average similarity. In this figure, most of the
simulated data also form something of a cloud around the mean; however, a small number of cases hover
around a probability of error of .5. Closer inspection of these runs reveals that this .5 probability of error
15The similarity function in question, called here s+ is:
s+(p, q) =
1
2
∣∣∣∑3i=1 pi −∑3j=1 qj∣∣∣+ d(p, q)
where d is Euclidean distance. This is a similarity function that declares vectors are more similar when their entries sum to the
same number; i.e. it judges (1, 1, 0) as fairly similar to (0, 1, 1), because their entries both sum to 2.
16Other categories show similar patterns as the samples depicted here.
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results from the agent choosing the same category for all objects: in these cases, the agent acts as if one of
the action strictly dominates the other. This single-action behavior seems inconsistent with human behavior.
Input: aspiration value H, memory M
Parameters: Mix probability p1, mix level α1, Base increase probability p2, increase
amount γ2
1. Mix with long run average: With probability p1,
H ′ = (1− α1)H + α1
(∑
(q,a,r)∈M r
#(M)
)
Else
H ′ = H
2. Occasionally increase aspiration level: With probability p2#(M)
H ′′ = H ′ + γ2
Else
H ′′ = H ′
Output: New aspiration value H ′′
Figure 15: The Aspiration Updating Algorithm
A dynamic, endogenous aspiration level can assure long-run convergence to optimal behavior in repeated
choice settings such as this one, provided the updating scheme that is ‘ambitious’ and ‘realistic’ (Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 1996). That is, an aspiration level that starts below the long-run average payoff, updates to the
long-run average payoff in some mixture with the current level, and also occasionally receives increases that
are unrelated to the relationship between the aspiration level and long-run average payoff. Moreover, these
increases must happen decreasingly often, and converge to occur with a probability of zero. We implement
this scheme in this framework as depicted in Figure 15. Note that the rate of convergence diminishes at a
rate proportional to the number of trials; this rate could also be considered another parameter.
Although this method does not improve the fit for NP96, it does appear to make a qualitative improvement
for N94; see Figures 16 and 17. Type II separation is seen earlier than in the benchmark model, and problem
type V I remains more difficult than the other problems through the final block. A value of p1 = .03 means
that updating to the average occurs about once every two blocks ( 12·16 ≈ .03) and a value of p2 = .06 and
γ2 = .1 means that the aspiration level increases approximately once every block, by .1 each time.
17 The
MSE, at .22, remains comparable to the benchmark model. Therefore, among the variations considered here,
the strongest argument could be made for this variation; only the model complexity criterion argues against
it.
17This does imply that the aspiration level may exceed 1.
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Figure 16: Human data.
Source: N94.
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Figure 17: CBSA w/ endogenous aspiration level
λ = 6.5, precall = .7, Initial H = .7,MSE = .22
p1 = .03, α1 = .2, p2 = .06, γ2 = .1
5.3. Comparison to Cognitive Models
One leading formal model of classification learning is known as ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992). ALCOVE is
one of only a handful of computational models that provide a good fit to N94, and it is the only one that has
been shown, like CBSA, to also fit NP96. ALCOVE is an adaptive network model (artificial neural network)
that instantiates the exemplar theory of categorization (Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986). The
exemplar view states that the psychological representation of a category is the stored examples themselves
(i.e., no abstractions are formed) and the process of classification is based on the similarity between each
stored example and the stimulus. The trial-by-trial learning process in ALCOVE consists of storing each new
object that is experienced and using error-driven learning to optimize both the mapping between examples
and the correct category labels and attention weights for each dimension in the similarity function. By
contrast, CBSA and CBDT store every trial, whether or not that trial involves encountering a new object.18
ALCOVE is able to match the N94 data on the same qualitative metrics as CBSA. ALCOVE also exhibits
more pronounced Type II separation. On quantitative fit, ALCOVE is substantially better: an MSE of .06
versus .17 for CBSA.19 ALCOVE is also able to match the NP96 data on all qualitative metrics, as CBSA
has, with a MSE of .10 versus .17 for CBSA.
ALCOVE employs four free parameters: the rate of learning of association weights, the rate of learning
of attention weights, the degree of specificity with which exemplars are activated by similar stimuli, and a
bias on the mapping between category label activation and actual response behavior. When these parameter
settings are optimized to match human data, high attentional learning and high specificity allow ALCOVE to
best fit N94, while low (zero) attentional learning and low specificity produce a close fit for NP96 (Nosofsky
18One might say that CBDT stores “task exemplars” to ALCOVE’s “object exemplars.”
19Nosofsky et. al report the mean squared error for the first sixteen blocks; the CBSA value reported here is also measured
for the first sixteen blocks and therefore deviates slightly from the value reported in Section 5.1.
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et al., 1994; Nosofsky and Palmeri, 1996). When CBSA’s parameters are optimized to match human data,
CBSA also exhibits high attentional learning (λ > 0) in N94 and low attentional learning (λ = 0) in NP96.
In contrast to ALCOVE, however, the other parameters of the best fit are quite similar between the best
fitting models of N94 and NP96: H = .8, .85 and precall = .7, .6. In fact, there is a single set of parameters
H = .825, precall = .65, and λ = 0, 5 as appropriate, which fit both N94 and NP96 fairly well: with an MSE
of .24 for N94 and .23 for NP96.
6. Conclusion
We present a computational implementation of Case-based Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler,
1995) that can generate choice data consistent with an instance of CBDT for an arbitrary choice problem.
The implementation is called the Case-based Software Agent or CBSA. We use CBSA to test the performance
on a benchmark set of problems from the psychological literature on human classification learning exemplified
by Shepard et al. (1961) and Nosofsky et al. (1994). We find the choice behavior of CBSA (and therefore
Case-based Decision Theory) fits two canonical experiments’ worth of human choice data very well. The
best-fitting benchmark model fits both the relative difficulty of these categorization problems and the speed
of learning to solve these classification problems (i.e. probability of error over time). We find that imperfect
memory is an important factor to match human data: with perfect memory, CBDT learns the problem
orders of magnitude faster than humans. On the topic of imperfect memory, we find some evidence that
imperfect recall, instead of imperfect storage, is the mechanism that best matches human data. We find
dimensionality of the problem is an important factor, and encoding the dimensionality according to their
natural definition provides the best fit to human data. We find that the aspiration level is important: the
best-fitting model indicates that humans aspire to a success rate between .8 and .85 on this problem, and
they may increase their aspiration level during the experiment.
This computational implementation of Case-based Decision Theory can be calibrated to and tested against
human data in any existing experiment which can be represented in a game-theoretic form as we do here.
This suggests a model for future studies. As these studies accumulate, we will learn whether and when
Case-based Decision Theory provides an adequate explanation of human behavior in other decision settings
and may also learn which parameters appear to vary by setting and which, if any, remain constant across
settings. This could lead to a version of CBDT which can be used to simulate human behavior in a variety
of economic models.
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